Security challenges and their management in border areas

Challenges of border security

  • Borders are the visible symbols of a country’s sovereignty, unity and integrity. Borders are seen as a symbol of national pride.
  • There are three distinct sets of borders at the international level:
    • Land borders
    • Maritime boundaries
    • Airspace
  • Border management in the present world order is a complex proposition. The transgressor is always on the lookout for soft gaps on land, along the coast or if need be, from the air.
    • The 1995 Purulia incident has already demonstrated our vulnerability from the air. It is therefore necessary to adopt a holistic approach to border management.
  • Managing borders is difficult for several reasons.
    • Some of our maritime boundaries are still unsettled.
    • Land borders are not fully demarcated.
    • Sections of our borders are based on artificial boundaries and not natural features.

India’s land boundaries with her immediate neighbours

  • India shares approx. 15,000 kilometres of boundary with her immediate neighbours, namely Pakistan (3,323 km), China (3,488 km), Nepal (1,751 km), Bhutan (699 km), Myanmar (1,643 km) and Bangladesh (4,096 km).
  • India’s boundary with each of her neighbours runs through a variety of ecological milieus, each with its own unique setting and associated problems. For example,
    • the India-Pakistan border areas are spread across extreme climatic conditions, given that the boundary runs from the hot Runn of Kuchh to Thar Desert in Rajasthan to the cold Himalayas in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Similarly, in the north, the India-China boundary runs along one of the loftiest mountain ranges covered with snow all through the year.
    • The India-Myanmar boundary is draped with lush tropical forests with myriad undergrowths.
    • The Indo-Bangladesh boundary has to cope with the ever-shifting riverbeds in the region.
    • These diverse ecological and climatic conditions create immense hurdles for extending the security and administrative reach in these border areas.
  • Coupled with this, the man-made nature of these boundaries also throws up serious issues, such as border disputes, porous borders, continuance of transborder ethnic and social ties, etc. Together, they pose a serious challenge to the effective management of the borders.
  • Indo-Pakistan Border:
    • The India-Pakistan boundary is categorised under three different heads:
      • Radcliff line: This is 2,308 km long, stretches from Gujarat to parts of Jammu district in Jammu and Kashmir.
      • Line of Control (LoC): This line is 776 km long and runs along the districts of Jammu (some parts), Rajouri, Poonch, Baramula, Kupwara, Kargil and some portions of Leh.
      • Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL): This is 110 km long and extends from NJ 9842 to Indira Col in the North.
    • The LoC and the AGPL have seen constant tensions with border skirmishes and firing between the armies, and border security forces constantly guarding boundaries of both the countries. The LoC has been vulnerable to constant infiltration by foreign terrorists, Kashmiri separatists and Pakistani army regulars for long.
    • Like the Bangladesh boundary, the India-Pakistan boundary also does not follow any geographical barrier. It runs through diverse terrain like deserts, marshes, plains and snow clad mountains, and winds its way through villages, houses and agricultural lands, making it extremely porous.
    • Porosity of this border has facilitated various illegal activities, such as
      • smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, and infiltration. Heroin and fake Indian currency are the two predominant items of smuggling along this border. Other items include saffron, textiles and mercury, which are smuggled from Pakistan. The villagers adjacent to the border are alleged to be involved in smuggling in a big way.
      • Money laundering is also quite rampant along the border. A large scale hawala network is flourishing in Punjab, especially in Ludhiana.
    • In addition, the border population has also been subjected to hostile propaganda by Pakistan, designed to mislead and sway their loyalties.
    • The Sir Creek area, due to its peculiar terrain, makes the movement of border guarding forces very difficult and thus provides scope for illegal fishing in the creeks.
    • A discordant political relationship, three-and-a-half wars and Pakistan’s material support for secessionist militants in the border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir compelled India to harden its international border with Pakistan.
    • An inward-looking economy and the absence of an imperative for regional economic integration also resulted in restricted movement of people and goods across the border.
    • However, in the past decade or so, an emergent Indian economy coupled with both countries’ desire to engage themselves constructively had paved the way for softening the border and the India Pakistan border gradually opened up for increased trade and travel.
    • Moreover inadequate manpower, lack of resources and inadequate cooperation from Pakistan make management of the border difficult. As a result, India has to continuously balance the imperatives of maintaining the border as a barrier against cross-border terrorism with softening it to enable the regulated flow of trade and travel.
  • Indo-China Border
    • The entire Sino-Indian border (including the western LAC, the small undisputed section in the centre, and the MacMahon Line in the east) is 4,056 km long and traverses five Indian states: Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. On the Chinese side, the line traverses the Tibet Autonomous Region.
      • The demarcation existed as the informal ceasefire line between India and China after the 1962 conflict until 1993, when its existence was officially accepted as the ‘Line of Actual Control’ in a bilateral agreement.
    • China is in occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir.
      • In addition, under the so-called China-Pakistan “Boundary Agreement” of 1963, Pakistan ceded 5,180 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China.
    • China claims approximately 90,000 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh and about 2000 sq. kms. in the Middle Sector of the India-China boundary. Beijing has stated that it does not recognise Arunachal Pradesh.
      • The border between China and India has never been officially delimited. China’s position on the eastern part of the border between the two countries is consistent.
      • Not a single Chinese government recognises the “illegal” McMahon Line. For China, the McMahon Line, stands as a symbol of imperialist aggression on the country. The so-called “Arunachal Pradesh” dispute is China’s most intractable border issue.
      • Because the gap between the positions of China and India is wide, it is difficult for both nations to reach consensus. The area of this disputed region is flat and rich in water and forest resources.
    • Arunachal Pradesh is the only issue which has a potential for conflict between India and China. If ever India and China go to war one day, it will be on this issue.
    • India considers recurring Sino-Indian border clashes a potential threat to its security. Since the war, each side continued to improve its military and logistics capabilities in the disputed regions.
    • China has continued its occupation of the Aksai Chin area, through which it built a strategic highway linking Xizang (i.e. Tibet) and Xinjiang autonomous regions.
    • China had a vital military interest in maintaining control over this region, whereas India’s primary interest lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state in the northeast bordering Xizang Autonomous Region.
  • Indo-Bangladesh Border
    • India shares the longest border (4,096 km) with Bangladesh. Bangladesh borders the Indian states of West Bengal in the west and north, Assam and Meghalava in the north-east, and Tripura and Mizoram in the east.
    • The boundary was drawn by ‘Bengal Boundary Commission’. Instead of following natural barriers, it meanders through villages, agricultural lands and rivers, rendering the border extremely porous.
    • In 1974, three years after the liberation of Bangladesh, the then prime ministers of India and Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, inked an agreement to settle the land boundary issue.
      • The Indira-Mujib Agreement laid down the methods for demarcating various disputed stretches of the India-Bangladesh boundary. Under the agreement, India retained the southern half of enclaves and Bangladesh retained the other half.
      • A revised version of the agreement was adopted by the two countries on 7 May 2015, when the Parliament of India passed the 100th Amendment to the Indian Constitution. Under this agreement, which was ratified on 6 June 2015, India received 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in the Indian mainland, while Bangladesh received 111 Indian enclaves in the Bangladeshi mainland. The enclave residents were allowed to either continue residing at their present location or move to the country of their choice.
      • Now, the only remaining enclave is Dahagram–Angarpota, an exclave of Bangladesh.
    • A major consequence of the porous border is the ease with which it is crossed illegally. The trend of illegal migration from Bangladesh into India has continued since independence.
      • Various ‘push’ factors, such as poverty, political upheavals, religious persecution, demographic pressures and environmental crises, and ‘pull’ factors, such as availability of land, employment opportunities, medical care and education, have contributed to the large-scale influx of Bangladeshis into India.
    • The porosity of the border also allows Indian insurgents to cross over to Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries for asylum. Porous border, lack of economic opportunities, poverty and underdevelopment, attitude of the people towards petty crimes, laxity in vigilance, alleged nexus between criminals and police and border guarding forces all contribute to the escalating trans-border crimes.
      • Smuggling of cattle has become a serious concern. Truckloads of cattle from Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are shipped to the India-Bangladesh border everyday, ostensibly for grazing purposes. From here, these cattle are smuggled into Bangladesh. The Border Security Force (BSF) regularly seizes cattle.
      • Along with cattle, smuggling of arms and other essential items, such as sugar, salt and diesel, human and narcotics trafficking, counterfeit Indian currency, kidnapping, and thefts are quite common along this border.
  • Indo-Nepal Border
    • As close neighbours, India and Nepal share a unique relationship of friendship and cooperation characterized by open borders and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of kinship and culture.
    • There has been a long tradition of free movement of people across the borders. Nepal has an area of 147,181 sq. kms. and a population of 29 million. It shares a border of over 1850 kms in the east, south and west with five Indian States-Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand-and in the north with the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China.
    • The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 forms the bedrock of the special relations that exist between India and Nepal.
      • Under the provisions of this Treaty, the Nepalese citizens have enjoyed unparalleled advantages in India, availing facilities and opportunities at par with Indian citizens. Nearly 6 million Nepali citizens live and work in India.
    • Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) is the border guarding force for Indo-Nepal border.
    • There are many points of dispute, mostly a result of the constantly shifting courses of the turbulent Himalayan Rivers (especially Kalapani and Susta). The submergence, destruction and removal of border pillars and encroachment into no-man’s land by people from either side add to the problem. Allegations of excesses, such as intimidation and forcible grabbing of land by either side along the disputed border, also surface from time to time.
    • The disputed border has created unease not only between the two countries but also among their local populations. Unrestricted migration over the years has produced territorial pockets dominated by people originating from the other country.
    • An open border allows easy access to terrorists and insurgents.
      • In the late 1980s, Sikh and Kashmiri terrorists sneaked into India via Nepal.
      • ULFA, NDBF and KLO have misused the open border in the past.
      • Earlier, reportedly, Maoists often escaped into India when pursued by Nepalese security agencies. Apart from insurgents and terrorists, many hard-core criminals pursued by Indian and Nepalese security forces escape across the open border.
      • ISI, LeT and other terrorist organisations are continuously using Nepal as a transit route and are also operating from soil of Nepal. They are taking advantage of the open and porous border.
    • The Issue of Madhesis:
      • A new constitution was promulgated in Nepal on 20 September 2015. It has failed to satisfy the Madheshis and Tharus who constitute 70 per cent of the Terai population.
      • This led to a violent Madheshi agitation in Nepal in general and in the Terai region been paralysed.
      • Their main demand is-“proportional political equity of a highly populated Madhesh in Kathmandu”.
      • After the second amendment, the constitution of Nepal attempted to satisfy one of the key demands of the protesters – on participation and proportional inclusion. The Madhesi parties did not accept this amendment because this change again was ambiguous and did not specify rights in particular to the Madhesis.
  • Indo-Myanmar Border
    • The boundary was demarcated in 1967 under an agreement signed by both countries.
    • The location of the Indo-Myanmar border throws up many challenges for its effective management.
      • Though the boundary is properly demarcated, there are a few disputed pockets.
      • The rugged terrain makes movement and overall development of the area difficult.
      • The internal dynamics of the region in terms of clan loyalties of the tribal people, inter-tribal clashes, insurgency and trans-border ethnic ties also adversely affect the security of the border areas.
      • There Is practically no physical barrier along the border either in the form of fences or border outposts and roads to ensure strict vigil.
      • Close ethnic ties among the tribes, such as Nagas, Kukis, Chin, etc., who live astride the border, help Insurgents in finding safe haven in Myanmar.
      • The location of the boundary at the edge of the ‘golden triangle‘ facilitates unrestricted illegal inflow of drugs into India.
      • The smuggling of arms and ammunition, precious stones and Chinese made consumer items finds its way into India illegally.
      • Red Sanders, ATS (amphetamine type stimulant), grocery items, bicycle parts, etc. are smuggled from India.
      • Human trafficking is also rampant along the border.
      • The provision of allowing the tribal communities of both countries to travel up to 16 km across the border without any passport of visa called ‘Free Movement Regime‘ has also contributed to increased Smuggling in the region.
    • India is constructing to seal its 1,624-kilometre (1,009 mile) long border with Burma. India hopes to curtail cross-border crime, including goods, arm and counterfeit Indian currency smuggling, drug trafficking, and insurgency.
    • Indian Army’s Assam rifles has been deployed there for border guarding.
  • Indo Bhutan Border:
    • The Bhutan-India Border is the international boundary between the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Republic of India.
    • The border is 699 km long, and adjoins the Indian states of Assam (267 km), Arunachal Pradesh (217 km), West Bengal (183 km), and Sikkim (32 km).
    • The Treaty of Peace between Britain and Bhutan demarcated the border in 1865, following the Bhutan War. The boundary was further detailed and refined in the 1973-1984 period through talks between Bhutan and India.
      • Remaining disputes have been minor and concern part of the border with Arunachal Pradesh, and the region between Sarbhang and Geylegphug.
    • The border between Bhutan and India is the only land access into entering Bhutan, as the border with China is completely closed. The single entry point for foreign nationals is between the towns of Jaigaon in the Indian state of West Bengal and Phuntsholing, in South WestBhutan.
    • Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) has been deployed to guard the border on its side. The bilateral Indian-Bhutan Group Border Management and Security has been established to collaboratively assess and secure the border between the two countries.
    • The boundary is demarcated except along the tri-junction with China, where the boundary is open.
      • The border was peaceful till Indian insurgent groups such as KLO, ULFA and NDBF established camps in the southern districts of Bhutan though these were flushed out later.
      • Taking advantage of the open border, these insurgents would sneak into Bhutan after carrying out extortions killings and bomb blasts.
      • Smuggling and trafficking are also rampant along the border.
      • Chinese made goods, Bhutanese cannabis, liquor and forest products are major items smuggled into India.
      • Livestock, grocery items and fruits are smuggled to Bhutan.

Coastal security and island territories

  • Water channels, most of which are interconnected and run deep inside the land, render the coastline porous and hence vulnerable to cross-border infiltration smuggling and arms and drugs trafficking. Existence of mangrove forest, sandbars and uninhabited islands along the coast provide ideal hideaways for infiltrators and criminals.
    • In recent years, the use of sea by terrorists to carry out attacks, as was seen during the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts and the November 2008 attack on Mumbai, have also added a new dimension to the vulnerability of the coastline.
  • The matter is made worse by the existence of several high value targets such as oil refineries, atomic power plants, space stations, ports and naval bases along the coastline.
    • There is growing worry about non-conventional threats as well as terrorist attacks, sabotage, etc., on such targets which could potentially inflict massive damage.
  • Straying of both Indian and Pakistani fishermen into each other’s territorial waters and their subsequent arrests has also been a perennial source of concern.
    • It is feared that at least some of the arrested fishermen could be recruited by Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and used as agents against India and their boats could be used to sneak in arms, explosives and operatives into India. Since these boats have Indian make and registration number, they could easily evade attempts by Indian security agencies to track them. This is what seems to have happened when the Coast Guard let off the ‘Kuber’, the vessel in which the terrorists travelled in November 2008.
  • Strategic location of the island territories, i.e. their proximity to the important Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and Southeast Asian and African countries, coupled with considerable distance from the mainland add to their vulnerability.
    • In recent years, intelligence reports have suggested that many uninhabited islands are being misused by terrorist groups and criminal gangs as transit points for smuggling arms and narcotics.
    • Internal disturbances in India’s neighbouring littoral countries also make the security scenario of the island territories extremely grim. The Andaman and Nicobar islands have seen large scale influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka (Tamils), Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia.
    • Besides, the Indian Ocean has been a theatre of intense rivalries between great powers, mostly extra-regional powers.

Techniques of effective border management:

  • Building of fences and erecting floodlights
  • Creating effective Border outposts (BoP)
  • Step-up infrastructure development, like roads
  • Effective patrolling and building of observation post towers
  • Building of Naka/machan
  • Equipping the security forces with night vision technologies
  • Installation of CCTV and thermal imaging equipment

The kargil review committee report and its observations on border management

  • The concept of border management assumed greater importance in the government lexicon only in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999, and the subsequent report submitted by the Kargil Review Committee.
  • Based on the recommendations of the Review Committee, the Government of India, in April 2001, set up a ‘task force’ on border management under the chairmanship of Madhav Godbole. This task force was part of a Group of Ministers (GoM) constituted to review the national security system as a whole and the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee in particular.
  • The task force’s objective was to ‘consider measures for border management and, in particular, to consider the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee in this regard and formulate specific proposals for the GoM’s consideration’.
  • The report observed that the country’s borders cannot be effectively managed because of certain inherent problems, such as
    • their disputed nature, artificiality and porosity, which according to it give rise to multiple problems like illegal migration, smuggling, drugs trafficking, and trans-border movement of insurgents.
    • In addition, the multiplicity of forces employed to guard the same border, their repeated withdrawal from the borders for other duties, the lack of adequate infrastructure along the border, etc., prevent them from efficiently guarding the border.
  • To address these vital issues the GoM recommended:
    • Concerted efforts are to be made to settle border disputes and demarcate the borders at the earliest opportunity
    • ‘Department of Border Management’ be created
    • One border guarding force should be deployed on one border and it should not be distracted from its principal task and deployed for other internal security duties
    • Establishment of a marine police force, strengthening of Coast Guard and setting up of an apex institution for coordinating various maritime issues
    • Accelerated development of infrastructure along the border, especially to wean away the border population from illegal activities

Approach to Border Management:

  • The approach as employed by the Government towards managing the borders has four important elements, viz. (a) guarding, (b) regulation, (c) development Dorder areas, and (d) constituting bilateral institutional mechanisms for resolving disputes and ironing out conflicts with neighbours. 
  • Guarding:
    • The BSF has been assigned responsibility for the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders,
    • Assam Rifles (AR) for the India-Myanmar border,
    • the So-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) for the India-China border, and
    • the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) for the India-Nepal and India-Bhutan borders.
    • For managing the borders effectively, it Is important to have better surveillance. Surveillance is carried out by conducting regular patrols by the Datinel guarding our borders. To house these personnel and to send regular patrols and to interact with the nearby villages, border out posts (BOP) have been set up all along the borders.
    • The inter-BOP distances along various borders are far greater than the recommended 2.5 km. For securing the riverine and creek areas along the India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan borders, the water wing of the BSF is deployed.
    • In addition, several electronic surveillance equipment like Night Vision Devices, Hand Held Thermal Imagers, Battle Field Surveillance Radars, Direction Finders, Unattended Ground Sensors, High Powered Telescope, etc. are used by the border guarding forces as force multipliers for greater surveillance.
  • Regulation:
    • Efficient regulation of movement of people and goods is the hallmark of an effective border management strategy. For this, the government has to facilitate legitimate trade and travel while simultaneously checking illegal migration, infiltration of insurgents and terrorists and prevent smuggling.
    • Building barriers is an effective means and for this fencing is employed but it is not an easy task. Some problem areas are:
      • Acquisition of land
      • Inordinate delay due to non-cooperation by local bodies 
      • In many instances, vested interests and state governments try to halt the process due to vote bank politics by illegal migrants
    • Another method of regulation is issuance of multi-purpose national identity cards and construction of Integrated Check Posts (ICPS) to facilitate legal trade and movement.
  • Development of Border Areas:
    • Border areas remain inaccessible and underdeveloped due to difficult terrain and lack of facilities like proper roads, educational institutions and hospitals. Lack of economic opportunities makes the border population more susceptible to take up smuggling and trafficking.
    • Keeping in mind these problems, the Union government initiated the ‘border area development programme‘ (BADP) in 1987 to provide adequate social and economic infrastructure, promote participation in development, eliminate sense of alienation, and instil a sense of security among the border people.
      • BADP schemes comprise of development of community based infrastructure like forestry, pasture land, fishery ponds, floriculture parks, community centres, mobile dispensaries, mini marketing yards, etc.
      • Over the years, the nature of the programme has changed from a schematic one with emphasis on education to a state-level programme with emphasis on balanced development of border areas.
      • Grass-root level institutions such as panchayati raj institutions, district councils/traditional councils are encouraged to participate in deciding the priority schemes for their areas.
    • North-east India, which shares 98 per cent of its borders with Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, has been plagued by insurgency and under-development. Its strategic location as a gateway to South East Asia has propelled the government to undertake various developmental programmoes in recent years.
  • Constituting Bilateral Institutional Mechanisms:
    • To facilitate bilateral dialogue on matters of mutual concern regarding border management, the Government of India has constituted a system of institutionalised interaction through the meetings of home secretaries, area commanders of border guarding forces and the joint working group on border management.
    • National level meetings (NLMS) and sectoral level meetings (SLM) also take place under the Home Secretary and the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, respectively. The primary objective of these meetings is ‘to maintain peace and tranquillity all along the border’ and to attain this objective, the two sides have agreed to ‘prevent inadvertent violations of each others’ territories by their security forces’ and also to ‘monitor and curb effectively all illegal and negative activities such as trans-border movement of insurgents, narco-traffickers and others involved in nefarious activities’.
    • Border liaison meetings (BLMS) take place between local Area Army Commanders at designated places every six months.
    • These bilateral mechanisms have been helpful in sensitizing each other about their respective security concerns and formulating strategies for better management of the border.

Securing the coasts and island territories

  • Coastal Security in Brief:
    • For securing the coasts, the Government of India has implemented a three-layered mechanism.
      • At the outermost layer, the Indian Navy patrols the high seas and carries out aerial reconnaissance with ship-based aircraft.
      • The intermediate layer comprising the Exclusive Economic Zone (between 12 and 200 nautical miles) is patrolled by the Coast Guard.
      • The areas around the land sea interface are patrolled by the Coastal Police.
    • On the recommendation of the Task Force, the Indian government launched the coastal security scheme in 2005-06.
      • The scheme envisaged the establishment of ’73 coastal police stations equipped with 204 boats, 153 jeeps and 312 motorcycles for mobility on coast and in close coastal waters’ over a period of five years.
      • Coastal police stations do not have adequate trained manpower, nor sophisticated arms or patrol boats. The personnel deployed in these police stations are reluctant to undertake sea patrolling. They complain of sea sickness, lack of proper training and absence of high speed patrol boats.
    • Following the Mumbai terror attacks, the government has also announced a series of measures for strengthening coastal security of the country. These include:
      • Expediting the implementation of coastal security scheme 
      • Speedy delivery of 204 interceptor boats
      • Easing of environmental norms for setting up coastal police stations
      • Issuance of multi-purpose identity cards to all fishermen, sea ferrying personnel and coastal villages
      • Implementation of uniform licensing of fishing boats across the country
      • Installation of special transponders and global positioning system on registered boats for identification and tracking,
      • Deployment of commando units of Central Industrial Security Force in all ports 
      • Constitution of a unified command for coastal districts to counter terrorist threats from the sea
    • For the security of the Island Territories, the Indian Government has set up a joint command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, called the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), comprising personnel of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Coast Guard.
      • Among other responsibilities, the ANC is also mandated to look after the defence of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
  • India’s Maritime Security: Challenges and Management:
    • India has a vast coastline extending more than 7500 km with nearly 1200 islands and a large EEZ (exclusive economic zone.) of about 2 million sq. km.
    • The Indian Ocean, through which much of the world’s ships transit, is distinguished by a land rim on three sides. Maritime access to the region is possible only through certain choke points leading to and from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and from the southern Indian Ocean.
    • India flanks the first two regions and has a central position overseeing the third. Its peninsular feature provides a natural reach across wide sea spaces in all directions, extended by the islands of the Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshadweep island group.
    • India’s central position in the Indian Ocean Region(IOR), dominating the main International shipping lanes(ISL), gives it a distinct advantage, it places the outer fringes of the IOR and most ‘choke points’ almost equidistant from India, thereby facilitating reach, sustenance and mobility of its maritime forces across the region.
    • The vastness of maritime domain demands a significant amount of resources and investment to ensure its security against challenges emanating from the traditional and non-traditional threats.
    • Challenges The greatness of India’s maritime domain with its distinctive geography and shift of global maritime focus from Atlantic-Pacific combine to Indo-Pacific continuum has thrown numerous challenges to its security.
      • Traditional Threats The traditional threats emanate from the nation states, it may involve issues like maritime border disputes, claims of maritime resources, strategic interests etc. Presently we face these threats from Pakistan, China and Sri Lanka.
        • India-Pakistan:
          • The main concern between India and Pakistan is the dispute of ‘SIR CREEK‘. It is a 96 km stretch of estuary in the marshes of ‘RUNN OF KUTCH’, opening into the Arabian Sea, which separates India’s Gujarat and Pakistan’s Sindh.
          • The disputed region of Sir Creek has very little strategic or military significance but the region is rich in fishing resources, considered to be one of the largest fishing ground in Asia.
          • The region is expected to be rich in hydrocarbon and shale gas with immense economic potential.
          • If boundary gets defined it would help in determining the maritime boundaries which will further decide the limits of EEZ and Continental shelf.
          • In 1965 a dispute in this region contributed to the full-fledged war between India and Pakistan.
          • Later ‘Indo-Pak western boundary case tribunal’ was set up to resolve the dispute. The tribunal upheld 90%of India’s claim to the entire Rann leaving the boundary to the south unresolved.
          • Since 1969 there have been eight rounds of ‘composite dialogue group’ held without any breakthrough. Since neither side has conceded any ground, India has proposed for the demarcation of maritime border first as per the provisions of Technical aspects of laws of sea’ (TALOS). However, Pakistan first wants the dispute to be resolved, taking it for international arbitration, which India has flatly denied citing it a purely bilateral issue.
          • With both the countries unable to agree on the exact boundary the differences flow into the Arabian Sea creating a vast stretch of disputed waters, where fishermen’s misery, terrorists’ design and global drug syndicates’ interests are all converging. There are indications that this area could be the world’s most active bed for drug trading.
        • India-Sri Lanka:
          • India and Sri Lanka have settled maritime boundary demarcation. However, there are few issues still left having direct bearing on the livelihood of the people residing there. Geographically India and Sri Lanka are very close e.g. the Palk Strait is just 22 nautical miles (nm) of water that separates the Indian Coast from the Sri Lankan Coast. This proximity results in the encroachment into each other’s territory by fishermen unknowingly resulting into arrests/detention, attacks etc.
          • In 1974 India agreed to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over a small barren island in the Palk bay area, named “KATCHCHATIVU” with some safeguards to Indian fishermen.
          • However, Sri Lankan government argues against the fishing rights of Indian fishermen in these waters where they have been fishing traditionally. The grant of “KATCHCHATIVU” has endangered the Indian fishermen’s right over the rich fishing waters. Whenever Indian folks stray into the Sri Lankan waters around the island, it leads to skirmishes and incidents.
          • The period after the defeat of LTTE has seen increased incidences of Indian fishermen coming into conflict with their counterpart in Sri Lanka and also with Sri Lankan Navy. There have been allegations of use of excessive force and even firearms to prevent fishermen from poaching.
        • India China:
          • In the context of security challenges from China to India, the maritime dimension is a relatively new factor.
          • The rapid growth of both economies led to increased demand of energy and raw materials, which are transported by sea. Both the economies are focusing on the sea lanes for the uninterrupted transportation of their trades and energy supply.
          • Thus, Indian navy has newfound commitments in the South China Sea whereas PLA Navy made forays into the Indian Ocean.
          • If we follow the trade routes of China, 40% of her oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz whereas 82% of her oil imports pass through the Malaccan Strait. Both these strategic shipping lanes are well within the reach and dominance of Indian and US navies.
          • This reality is forcing China to make her presence visible in the Indian Ocean through her ‘string of pearls policy’ in which she seems to encircle and constrict India.
          • The String of Pearls:
            • It is a geopolitical theory on potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan.
            • The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centres in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Somalia.
            • The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defence report, “Energy Futures in Asia”. The term has never been used by official Chinese government sources, but it is often used in Indian media.
            • The Chinese government insists that China’s burgeoning naval strategy is entirely peaceful in nature and is only for the protection of regional trade interests. An analysis by The Economist also found the Chinese moves to be commercial in nature.
            • Although it has been claimed that China’s actions are creating a security dilemma between China and India in the Indian Ocean, that has been questioned by some analysts, who point to China’s fundamental strategic vulnerabilities.
      • Non-Traditional Threats These are the threats from the non-state actors which impact the economy, society, and politics of the concerned states. These include Piracy, terrorism, trafficking, environmental issues, natural disasters etc. 
        • Maritime Terrorism:
          • In Indian perspective, terrorism in particular, has had a major impact on maritime security preparedness. The incidents of 1993 Mumbai serial blasts and 26/11 attack on Mumbai are glaring examples of how vulnerable sea routes can be used to infiltrate man and material to target the land.
          • The targets may be soft civilian assets like commercial hubs, population centres, transits, industrial centres, ports, ships as well as conventional military targets of strategic importance and offshore oil facilities or nuclear power plants.
        • Threats from Sea to Land:
          • In 1993, the explosives used for Mumbai serial blasts reached western shores of India in boats via sea routes.
          • The 26/11 attack was carried out by a group of terrorists who infiltrated through our porous maritime border.
        • Threats From Land to Sea:
          • In early 2000s Al-Qaeda bombed US naval ship USS Cole, killing 17 on board.
          • In 2003 the three Iraqi oil terminals were attacked in the Persian Gulf by explosive laden speed boats.
          • In 2014 Al-Qaeda militants tried to seize a Pakistani naval frigate to target US Navy vessels on northwestern Indian Ocean.
        • Smuggling:
          • The high seas are outside the jurisdiction of any single state or agency, hence there is always a reduced scope for the monitoring these areas. The non-state actors involved in the unregulated activities of trafficking/smuggling exploit this opportunity.
          • India having golden crescent on its left and golden triangle on its right is under constant pressure of unregulated movements at sea for trafficking of narcotics and arms. The traffickers/smugglers follow the modus operandi of trans-shipment of consignments on the high seas into local crafts, which then mingle with fishing activities offshore and can land at any of the myriad landing points ashore.
        • Piracy:
          • Piracy is the oldest form of maritime security threat. It targets trade, putting the economy of the concerned state and lives of the people on board at risk, restricting the freedom of using sea routes for economic growth.
          • Historically the waters of Gibraltar, straits of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, Madagascar and the English Channel are the most vulnerable routes for pirate raids.
          • The narrow channels with funnel shipping into predictable routes create opportunities for pirates.
          • In the last two decades Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has witnessed increased economic activities owing to increased demand of energy from China and India and their increased trade. This has lured the pirates into this region.
          • In recent years, Gulf of Aden and Somali based piracy has spread across Arabian Sea within 500 nm of India’s mainland. Strong action from our navy and coast guard pushed them away.
        • Illegal, Unreported & Unregulated Fishing (IUU):
          • IUU is a manifestation of human greed with an assumption that marine resources are an unlimited gift of nature. But it has been realized that marine living resources, although renewable, are not infinite and need to be managed on a sustainable basis.
          • IUU carries the risk of seriously damaging or even destroying living resources, marine environment, bio-diversity and future livelihood of the coastal populace.
          • As per the 2005 report of FAO (Food & Agriculture Organisation of UN) 75% of fishery resources in south-western Indian Ocean have been finished to their limits while the remaining 25% have been harvested beyond ecological sustainment.
          • It is affecting India as it impacts food and related economic security as well as livelihood of the Indian fishing community.
          • The prevailing tension between fishermen of India and Sri Lanka in Palk Bay is due to differently perceived claims on fishing area and employment of different fishing methods. Similarly Indian and Pakistani fishermen are subjected to detention by each other’s maritime and law enforcing agencies if they transgress into each other’s areas in the pursuit of big catch.
        • Climate Change:
          • It has its influence on maritime security with potentially major effects on the future. These are impacts on living resources, possible inundation of low lying coastal areas and islands, the loss of national territory etc.
          • The current trend of natural disasters like tropical cyclones, tornadoes, floods, coastal and marine inundation may get exacerbated with climatic changes.
          • We must set our priorities right to prepare ourselves to respond in an effective manner.
    • Managing Challenges:
      • The 26/11 attack made the Indian government realize the three basic lacunas in the Indian maritime security:
        • The porosity of its coastline
        • Inadequacy in the surveillance of its maritime domain, and 
        • Lack of co-ordination among various agencies playing role in maritime security.
      • To plug these loopholes the coastal and offshore security apparatus has accordingly evolved with an increased role of Indian navy as the central agency with coast guard in support along with the state police and other security agencies. The measures taken by GOI:
      • Integration of all maritime stakeholders including several states/UTS and central agencies into a new coast line security mechanism, National committee on strengthening maritime & coastal security (NCSMCS), under the cabinet secretary.
      • Naval commander-in-chief was designated as the Commander-in-chief, coastal police.
      • The director general, Coast Guard was re-designated as commander, coastal command, and was given the responsibility of overall coordination of central and state agencies in matters of coastal security.
      • Sagar prahari bal/ocean strike unit created by Indian navy aimed at protection of naval bases and other areas. 
      • Sagar suraksha dal an informal group of fishermen and trained volunteers of coastal areas are used for surveillance and intelligence gathering.
      • Issue of I-cards to all fishermen and over 2 lakh registrations of fishing vessels to facilitate their identification and tracking.
      • Coastal Security Scheme was approved in January 2005 for implementation in 5 years with an extension of 1 year, this scheme stands completed in March 2011. Phase II was to be implemented till 2016 starting from 2011. but it has been further extended up to 2020.
      • Indian navy has established four JOCS (JOINT OPERATION CENTRES) at Mumbai, Kochi, Visakhapattanam and Port Blair resulting in good coordination, synergy and understanding among stakeholders. 
      • The Indian navy has now set up the National Command Control Communication Intelligence (NC31) that hosts the information management and analysis centre (IMAC).
        • The focus is on building national maritime domain awareness grid (NMDA) via a number of organizational, operational and technological changes. This network connects 51 radar stations (20 Navy and 31 Coast Guards) located along the coasts and the island territory. It will collate, fuse, and disseminate critical intelligence and information about suspicious activities and movements at sea.
        • The Indian government is in talks with 24 countries for exchanging information on shipping to reinforce the NMDA.
      • For the security of island territories, the Indian government has set up a joint operation centre on the Andaman & Nicobar islands, Andaman & Nicobar commands comprising personnel of Indian Navy, the Army, the Air force and the Coast Guard.

Air space security, challenges & management

  • Before entering into security aspects of airspace we must have a clear idea of what airspaces encompasses. Basically it is the area of the atmosphere above the territory of the state.
  • The second decade of the twentieth century saw an increase in the international use of aircrafts for carrying passengers, cargo and military assets and this led to the question of air sovereignty.
    • The Paris Convention (1919) was the first of its kind to bring some clarity to the definition of air space and airspace sovereignty.
    • Later in 1944 the Chicago convention of international civil aviation, established a UN agency named International Civil aviation Organisation (ICAO) for co-ordinating and regulating use of airspace.
    • Both these conventions are considered milestone in airspace management.
  • “Every state has inclusive sovereignty over their airspace directly above its territory including its territorial waters.”
  • Few Definitions in Airspace:
    • Controlled Airspace: It is defined as airspace of defined dimensions within which air traffic control measures are provided.
    • Uncontrolled Airspace: In uncontrolled airspace all kind of flights are permitted where all participating flights can receive flight information services, if required.
    • Prohibited area: The prohibited area is generally defined in airspace keeping national security concerns in mind and sometimes environmental concerns. Within this space the flights are not permitted at any time or under any circumstances.
    • Restricted area: A restricted area is airspace of defined dimensions above the land area or territorial waters of a state within which the flight of aircrafts is restricted in accordance with specific conditions.
    • Danger area: It may be quite a large portion of airspace within which artillery practices, missile firing and other activities may take place and so the flight of aircrafts is restricted. 
  • Indian Airspace:
    • Indian airspace is a great three-dimensional space of 40 million cu. km covering the Indian mainland, islands and its territorial waters under its umbrella.
    • Factors like our hostile neighbours, increased air traffic owing to economic liberalisation and need to keep an eye on trade routes make our airspace management important and challenging.
    • Indian airspace, like any other airspace, has limited space left for civil aviation traffic and most of the airspace are marked prohibited, restricted or danger zone. Though these zones have their security significance but economic and commercial aspects need to be addressed with effective management of our airspace with increased investment in surveillance and other security measures.
      • The European concept of FUA (Flexible Use of Airspace) is being incorporated in managing our airspace for its efficient use for commercial exploits.
  • Security Challenges:
    • The security challenges to Indian airspace are highlighted by the infamous Purulia Arms drop case of 1995, followed by shooting down of a Pakistan Air Force’s surveillance aircraft killing all 17 on board in 1998.
    • Besides these, many minor incidences of airspace violation by our neighbouring countries come into light from time to time.
    • The incidents of global ramifications like 9/11 attack on WTC in USA, where civilian aircrafts are used to bring havoc, the disappearance of Air Malaysia aircraft MH370 and downing of another Malaysian air aircraft MH 17 near Ukraine must be kept in mind while planning for Indian airspace management.
  • Airspace management encompasses measures of air defense carried by Indian Air Force in association with Indian army and Indian navy in certain areas, Air Traffic Services (ATS) provided by Airport Authority of India, Indian Air force and to some extent by Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) and limited air defense roles of Indian Army and Indian Navy.
  • Airspace management comprises of the following activities:
    • Regulatory Functions
    • Surveillance
    • Control Mechanism
    • Weapon System and Interceptors
    • Air Traffic Control.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

error: Content is protected !!