UPSC syllabus topic (General Studies- Paper 1): World Wars, International Relations Between Two World Wars-III

International Relations Between Two World Wars-III

Appeasement Policy

• Appeasement was the policy followed by the British, and later by the French, of avoiding war with aggressive powers such as Japan, Italy and Germany, by giving way to their demands, provided they were not too unreasonable. ©crackingcivilservices.com
• There were two distinct phases of appeasement:
  • From the mid-1920s until 1937, there was a vague feeling that war must be avoided at all cost, and Britain and sometimes France drifted along, accepting the various acts of aggression and breaches of Versailles (Manchuria, Abyssinia, German rearmament, the Rhineland reoccupation).
  • When Neville Chamberlain became British prime minister in May 1937, he gave appeasement new drive; he believed in taking the initiative – he would find out what Hitler wanted and show him that reasonable claims could be met by negotiation rather than by force.

• The beginnings of appeasement can be seen in British policy during the 1920’s with the Dawes and Young Plans, which tried to conciliate the Germans, and also with the Locarno Treaties and their vital omission – Britain did not agree to guarantee Germany’s eastern frontiers, which even Stresemann, a moderate German Chancellor, said must be revised.
  • When Chamberlain, the British Foreign Minister, remarked at the time of Locarno that no British government would ever risk the bones of a single British grenadier in defence of the Polish Corridor, it seemed to the Germans that Britain had turned her back on eastern Europe.
• Appeasement reached its climax at Munich, where Britain and France were so determined to avoid war with Germany that they made Hitler a present of the Sudetenland, and so set in motion the destruction of Czechoslovakia.
• Even with such big concessions as this, appeasement failed.

What were the reasons for the policy of appeasement?

• At the time appeasement was being followed, there seemed to be many very good things in its favour, and the appeasers were convinced that their policy was right:
  • Economic difficulties:
    • Europe’s economy was still recovering from WWI and the effects of the Wall Street Crash. It was thought that a strong, prosperous Germany could help revitalise the economy of these nations. ©crackingcivilservices.com
    • During the 1930s there was a great trade depression and money was tight. With three million people unemployed, the government had to spend money on social welfare rather than weapons and soldiers.
    • British Prime Minister Chamberlain wanted to increase the amount of money used for social welfare, so was reluctant to increase military spending.
  • Economic co-operation between Britain and Germany would be good for both:
    • If Britain helped the German economy to recover, Germany’s internal violence would die down.
  • Public Opinion:

• • • Feelings expressed by British politician Lord Lothian during the Rhineland crisis that Germany was only going into their own back garden had support.
    • Popular opinion in Britain at the time was that German had been punished too heavily by the terms of the Versailles treaty. Paying reparations to the nations it had invaded had crippled the German economy.
    • Before the outbreak of war, many people admired Hitler. After the ruinous end of WW I, Hitler appeared to have rebuilt Germany and made it a powerful country again.
    • Of the British public only a minority favoured a stronger line, and then only when British interests/lives were threatened.
    • After devastating aerial bombing of Guernica in April 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, support for non-intervention increased as it was feared that another war would become inevitable.
    • Many people thought Hitler’s demands to regain control of territories that used to belong to Germany were justified as many of these territories had German-speaking populations.
      • Closer links between Germany and Austria were seen as inevitable. Some politicians held the view that Austria generally welcomed the Anschluss (Union of Germany with Austria) and that it would be futile to try and preserve their independence against their own wishes.
      • The Anschluss was not seen as a problem by most people because the Anschluss was seen as a product of the Versailles Settlement which was already widely discredited. ©crackingcivilservices.com
    • Minority opinions showed serious concern – part of the wider scheme of expansion and aggression by Hitler, this was the view of some anti-appeasers Conservatives such as Churchill.
      • Churchill called the Anschluss a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed.
      • Churchill believed that Hitler could not be dealt with because his aims and objectives were not rational. As such, no amount of appeasement would satisfy the man – he would always want more.
      • Churchill also described the German occupation of the Rhineland as a menace to Holland, Belgium and France.
      • Churchill was not alone in voicing concern. British Communists and those on the left wing of the Labour Party were alarmed at German militarization and aggression and demanded action against Hitler.
  • Pacifism:
    • The Oxford University student debating society voted by 257 votes to 153 that this house will in no circumstances fight for King and Country. This caused shock waves in the country.
    • A Conservative candidate supporting increases in defence spending was heavily defeated by a Labour candidate who was widely regarded as antiwar.
    • The Peace Ballot 1934:
      • A survey carried in Britain by the League of Nations Union had 11.5 million replies.
      • The response was overwhelming support for the principle of collective security through the League of Nations.
    • After the horrors of WWI, there was a widespread revulsion at the thought of war. Since then, new advances in weaponry, such as long distance bombers, meant towns and cities could be targeted and the civilian death toll could be huge in a future war.
    • The peace movement was expanding in Britain and rest of the Europe and public mood was very much against another European war.
  • Concern over the Empire:
    • Any war in Europe involving Britain could threaten the security of her Empire.
    • During the 1930s Britain’s empire had come under threat from Japan and Italy furthermore Britain had to deal with trouble in India and the Middle East and in Ireland. ©crackingcivilservices.com
    • In 1938 several countries in the British Empire, including Canada and South Africa said they would not go to war in support of Britain should war break out with Germany over Czechoslovakia.

• • Lack of reliable allies of Britain:
    • At time of Anschluss, Britain had no allies in the area around Austria. Italy was no longer a protector of Austria as it had been in 1934.
    • There were question marks over France’s ability to be an effective ally. The country was politically unstable during the 1930s with violent clashes in the streets between supporters of right and left wing parties.
    • At the Imperial Conference in London in 1937, member states of the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, made it clear that they would not take part in another war in Europe.
    • The USA was following a policy of isolation and was inclined to stay out of European affairs.
    • The League of Nations, established after WWI to help prevent future conflicts, had proved ineffective. The member states could not reach agreements or enforce their decisions.

• • Military weaknesses:
    • The British Government was concerned with the weakness of its armed forces.
    • There had been widespread disarmament in the 1920s; there were no troops immediately available to mount a challenge.
    • British military chiefs told Chamberlain that Britain was not strong enough to fight a war against more than one country at the same time.
    • At the time of the Anschluss, Chiefs of Staff warned the Government that fighting Hitler now might encourage Italy and Japan to take advantage of Britain’s overstretched and under-resourced overseas commitments.
    • Nazi propaganda encouraged Britain and France to believe that Germany’s forces were a lot stronger than they really were.
    • Even the navy, which was the strongest in the world apart from the American navy, would have found it difficult to defend Britain’s far-flung Empire and at the same time protect merchant shipping in the event of war against Germany, Japan and Italy simultaneously.
    • The USA was still in favour of isolation and France was weak and divided. ©crackingcivilservices.com
    • Chamberlain speeded up British rearmament so that ‘nobody should treat her with anything but respect’. The longer appeasement lasted, the stronger Britain would become, and the more this would deter aggression, or so Chamberlain hoped.

• • Fear over spread of Communism:
    • Many British politicians regarded Communism as a greater threat than Nazi Germany.
    • Their view of brutal Communism was reinforced by the brutal show trials in the 1930s in Stalin’s Soviet Union.
    • A common saying at the time was better Hitlerism than Communism.
    • Many believed that Hitler’s Germany would be a buffer against communist expansion westwards. In fact, many admired Hitler’s drive and his achievements.

• • Beliefs of Chamberlain:
    • Chamberlain believed that Hitler was making extreme statements only to gain publicity and that he was essentially a reasonable man who would choose negotiation rather than conflict.
    • Since the League of Nations seemed to be helpless, Chamberlain believed that the only way to settle disputes was by personal contact between leaders. In this way, he thought, he would be able to control and civilize Hitler, and Mussolini into the bargain, and bring them to respect international law.
    • Several prominent British politicians were very impressed by Hitler.
      • The former PM Lloyd George, who met Hitler in 1936 returned to Britain to describe him as a man of supreme quality.
      • The Labour MP and former party leader George Lansbury, who was a pacifist, wrote in 1937 that Hitler would not go to war unless other people pushed him into it.

Role of appeasement in international affairs in 1930s:

• Appeasement had a profound effect on the way international relations developed. Although it might have worked with some German governments, with Hitler it was doomed to failure. ©crackingcivilservices.com
  • Many historians believe that it convinced Hitler of the complacency and weakness of Britain and France to such an extent that he was willing to risk attacking Poland, thereby starting the Second World War.
• It is important to emphasize that appeasement was mainly a British policy, with which the French did not always agree.
  • Though French Prime Minister was in favour of conciliation, even he French drew the line at the proposed Austro-German customs union in 1931.
  • Louis Barthou, foreign minister in 1934, believed in firmness towards Hitler and aimed to build up a strong anti-German group which would include Italy and the USSR.
    • This is why he pressed for Russia’s entry into the League of Nations, which took place in September 1934.
    • He told the British that France ‘refused to legalize German rearmament’, contrary to the Versailles Treaties.
    • Unfortunately he was assassinated in October 1934.
  • Barthou’s successor, Laval, signed an alliance with Russia in May 1935, though it was a weak affair – there was no provision in it for military co-operation, since Laval distrusted the communists.
  • After this the French were so deeply split between left and right that no decisive foreign policy seemed possible as the right admired Hitler.
• Examples of appeasement:
  • No action was taken to check the obvious German rearmament.
    • Lord Lothian, a Liberal, had a revealing comment to make about this, after visiting Hitler in January 1935: ‘I am convinced that Hitler does not want war … what the Germans are after is a strong army which will enable them to deal with Russia.’
  • The Anglo-German Naval Agreement:
    • It condoned German naval rearmament and was signed without any consultation with France and Italy.
    • This broke the Stresa Front, gravely shook French confidence in Britain.
  • There was only half-hearted British action against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
  • The French, though disturbed at the German reoccupation of the Rhineland (March 1936), did not mobilize their troops.
    • They were deeply divided, and ultra cautious, and they received no backing from the British, who were impressed by Hitler’s offer of a 25-year peace.
    • Lord Lothian remarked that German troops had merely entered their own ‘back garden’.
  • Neither Britain nor France intervened in the Spanish Civil War:
    • Though Germany and Italy sent decisive help to Franco.
    • Britain tried to entice Mussolini to remove his troops by officially recognizing Italian possession of Abyssinia (April 1938); however, Mussolini failed to keep his side of the bargain.
  • Anschluss:
    • Though both Britain and France protested strongly at the Anschluss between Germany and Austria (March 1938), many in Britain saw it as the natural union of one German group with another.
    • But Britain’s lack of action encouraged Hitler to make demands on Czechoslovakia, which produced Chamberlain’s supreme act of appeasement and Hitler’s greatest triumph to date – Munich. ©crackingcivilservices.com